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RESOLUTION OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 
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Abstract: This article explains why it is so difficult to achieve peace in Nagorno-Karabakh and what factors 
prevent the peaceful resolution of the conflict. This conflict is very difficult to resolve because the 
conflicting parties have contradictory geopolitical interests and cannot achieve consensus during 
negotiations.  We have to take into account Russia‟s geopolitical interests in South Caucasus that Kremlin 
is interested in freezing this conflict to weaken both states, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and bring them back 
to Russia‟s orbit. Moscow aims to establish firm control over South Caucasus which was viewed in the past 
as a „Russian backyard‟.  Russia still views South Caucasus as its zone of influence and tries to bring this 
region back into Russia‟s orbit. 
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Since 27 September 2020 new clashes erupted in the breakaway region of 
Nagorno–Karabakh, which quickly escalated into a full-scale war. The fighting between 
Armenian and Azerbaijani troops lasted for six weeks. This conflict is often described as 
the first war in the history of modern warfare that has been won almost entirely with the 
help of drones. It is still unknown which side started the war, Yerevan and Baku blame 
each other for the escalation of the conflict. Despite efforts of the Russian brokered 
ceasefire, fighting continued until the 10th of November 2020 and neither side was 
willing to stop the war. On 9 October 2020, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan, Sergey Lavrov, Zograb Mnatsakanyan, and Jeyhun Bairamov, met in 
Moscow to end the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. After about ten hours of negotiations, 
the parties agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire, which came into force at midnight on 10 
October 2020. Nevertheless, the hostilities did not cease, and fighting continued in the 
breakaway region. 
The destruction has swept through this region with devastating force. Many 
towns and villages were razed to the ground and people were forced to leave front-line 
settlements. As a result of the bloody war, many settlements were transformed into 
ghost towns. The streets and houses are abandoned and deserted. The sound of distant 
artillery fire could be heard everywhere during the war. Those who decided to stay in the 
conflict zone were consigned to underground life in the shelters and bunkers. Both 
sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan, used long-range missiles to target civilian territories and 
populated areas.   
 
THE EMERGENCE OF WAR IN THE 1990s AND  
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS TO END THE CONFLICT 
 
This conflict started 30 years ago when the Soviet Union collapsed and ethnic 
tensions emerged in the South Caucasus. A brutal war erupted between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which finally ended with a cease-
fire in 1994 after the deaths of more than 30.000 troops. Ethnic Armenians won control 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region after a bitter and bloody war. They cemented their rule 
over this mountainous region, declaring independence and forging overland links with 
Armenia. With the help of Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh maintained control over its 
territory. After the 1994 exodus of ethnic Azerbaijanis, the area has acquired an exclusive 
Armenian character. According to the last Soviet survey, which was conducted in 1989, 
Armenians accounted for 77% of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh, while 
Azerbaijanis accounted for 22%. However, in the seven adjacent districts surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh, roughly 95% of the population was ethnic Azerbaijani. Regardless of 
the demographic composition, the two communities, Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived 
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and coexisted peacefully during Soviet times. But relations began to deteriorate 
between them in the final years of the Soviet Union. Armenia began to claim lands from 
Azerbaijan, ethnic tensions erupted and the trust that has been constructed for so many 
years suddenly evaporated within weeks. Hostilities between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis escalated into a full-scale war in 1992. Many atrocities and war crimes were 
committed by both sides and countless villages and towns were razed to the ground. 
A Ceasefire was signed in 1994 and peace talks began between the conflicting 
sides with the help of the OSCE Minsk group and three countries, Russia, France, and the 
USA acted as mediators in this conflict. In the intervening 30 years, nothing has been 
done to resolve the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and end the conflict through peaceful 
means. Peace talks were ongoing for 27 years but without any kind of progress. The 
OSCE Minsk Group, which is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation, and the 
United States, tried to bring all sides to a peace settlement, but all attempts to solve the 
conflict peacefully were futile. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was the result of 
diplomatic failure. There have been periodic violence and military skirmishes between 
the two conflicting sides. Over the last years numerous proposals were negotiated, but 
the most feasible road map, which is known as the Madrid Principles, was introduced in 
2007.  
That deal entails the following: First, districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh 
should be returned to the Azerbaijani control; Second, Nagorno-Karabakh should be 
granted an interim status and provided with security guarantees and self-governance; 
Third, a corridor has to be established to link Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; Fourth, the 
final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be determined through a legally binding 
expression of will; Fifth, all internally displaced people, and refugees should be granted 
the right to return to their former places of residence; Finally, international security 
guarantees in the form of peacekeeping operations should take hold across the region. 
Although the Madrid Formula presents the most feasible roadmap towards a 
peaceful resolution, the exact terms of each principle have been a matter of rigorous 
interpretation and negotiation. The biggest disagreement during negotiations was the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan has always rejected Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 
subordination to Baku and demanded guarantees of independence before engaging in 
any significant concessions. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan always refused to concede its 
territory to Armenia and thought that the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh was 
unacceptable and represented a serious threat to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. 
While Armenia stresses the importance of self-determination to resolve the status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan insists on maintaining its territorial integrity. As the 
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev stated during the interview, self-determination is an 
important principle of international law, but it should not violate the territorial integrity 
of the country (Toradze 2020). 
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FACTORS THAT CAUSED THE ESCALATION OF RECENT CONFLICT 
 
When the ethnic Armenian forces won the first war in 1994, they did not just take 
control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, they also occupied seven surrounding districts 
of Azerbaijan forcing out the ethnic Azeri population. Armenians too had to flee areas 
that remained under Azerbaijani control. These Azerbaijani districts, which are now 
largely depopulated, served as an important security buffer for Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Azerbaijan has taken an uncompromising stance demanding the return of occupied 
territories.  
In 2011 Russia proposed to start the Madrid principles with the return of 
Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Lavrov‟s plan, 
Armenians had to start the handover of 5 districts of Azerbaijan in stages and Russian 
troops were to be deployed into the regions under the guise of peacekeeping. 
According to this plan, five of the seven areas were to be returned to Azerbaijan. 
However, Armenia refused to make any concessions to Azerbaijan, and as a 
result, negotiations have remained at the deadlock since. There were numerous 
attempts to revive peace talks but much of it was a futile attempt. Armenians were 
satisfied with the status-quo and therefore denied making any concessions to 
Azerbaijan. If initially, after the end of the 1994 war, Armenians viewed the 7 adjacent 
districts of Nagorno-Karabakh as a bargaining chip during negotiations and were ready 
to make concessions to Azerbaijan, later any compromise to Azerbaijan was perceived 
as an act of betrayal of Armenia. Before the outbreak of the war, there was a widespread 
view in the Armenian society that all territories, even the seven adjacent districts of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, should remain under the firm control of Armenia. 
The Armenian leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh added fuel to the fire when it 
decided to incorporate the seven Azerbaijani districts into its administration.  New 
provisional borders were drawn, new roads were constructed and the abandoned 
Azerbaijani settlements were given Armenian names. Meanwhile, historical sites that 
were located in the Azerbaijani districts were embedded in Armenian banknotes. This 
was a clear indication and sign that Armenia did not intend to solve the Karabakh 
conflict peacefully and make any concessions to Azerbaijan. On top of everything, the 
Armenian government started to resettle ethnic Armenians from various parts of the 
world in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Before the outbreak of the war, the 
Armenian government had a plan to resettle Lebanese Armenians in the occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan and to create Armenian settlements in the Azerbaijani districts. 
These dangerous and provocative actions illustrated that Armenia was effectively 
annexing 20% of the Azerbaijanian Land. Not surprisingly any attempt of negotiations 
failed and peace talks remained paralyzed. Despite the many efforts of the international 
community to revive the peace talks, nothing could be done to reach a consensus 
among the conflicting parties.  
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Political rhetoric became increasingly belligerent on both sides. Azerbaijan many 
times warned the international community that it intended to liberate occupied 
territories by force, while Armenia threatened to take even more territories in the next 
war. Armed conflict was inevitable and in September 2020 large-scale hostilities erupted 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Both sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan have used 
sophisticated weapons and missiles to gain a strategic advantage in this bloody war. 
Azerbaijan has achieved total air superiority thanks to the drones that it bought from 
Turkey and Israel. Azerbaijan has used two types of drones during the war: The Turkish 
made Bayraktar drones and Israeli made „Kamikaze‟ drones. Over the last years, Turkey 
has increased its efforts to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus region. When the 
conflict broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey saw an opportunity and offered moral, 
political, and military support to Azerbaijan. In summer 2020, the two states held joint 
military exercises in Azerbaijan, and Turkey‟s supply of weapons to Azerbaijan 
dramatically surged, which included sophisticated weapons and advanced drones. It 
seems that this conflict was carefully planned for years by Turkish and Azerbaijani 
military officials. Emboldened by Turkish support, Azerbaijan has decided to retake the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region by force. 
While Azerbaijan has made some modest territorial gains, it hasn't swept the 
board as its military leaders had originally hoped. The Second Karabakh War highlighted 
the significant technological superiority of the Azerbaijani army. The armed forces of 
Azerbaijan managed to advance rapidly on certain sections of the front and regained 
control over a significant part of Nagorno-Karabakh, namely, its southern section. 
Azerbaijani army captured nearly the entire area near the border with Iran. Azerbaijan 
was able to gradually retake a significant part of the occupied territories around the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, including the Jabrayil, Zangilan, Fuzuli, and 
Qubadli districts. After liberating these territories, the armed forces of Azerbaijan 
advanced rapidly towards the Lachin corridor, which is a key supply line for the 
Armenians. The seizure of the Lachin corridor was the main objective of the armed 
forces of Azerbaijan because without the Lachin corridor Armenia‟s main artery to 
Nagorno-Karabakh would be cut off. Heavy fighting took place in the directions of 
Khojevand (Martuni) and Lachin, as well as on the northern front. Armenians did not 
manage to launch any effective counteroffensive and were constantly retreating during 
the war. The culmination of the war was the capture of the historic center of Karabakh, 
Shusha, by Azerbaijan, after which the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed 






Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 3, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 107 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF 2020 NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR AND  
RUSSIA‟S GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS 
 
Armenia had suffered significant military setbacks at the hand of Azerbaijani 
forces.  Not only has it lost most of the Azerbaijani districts it occupied in 1993, but also 
a significant part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the peace deal, the borders of Nagorno-
Karabakh have been redrawn and the armed forces of Armenia must leave the 
Armenian-controlled territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh by 1 December 2020.  
While the Azerbaijanis called the deal a victory, Armenians have called it a national 
humiliation. Armenia‟s Prime Minister Nicole Pashinyan described the deal as an 
unbelievably painful decision. 
Russia is a military ally of Armenia and maintains a military base in this country. 
Armenia is a member of Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, as well as the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO is a military-political block under Russian 
auspices. It was expected that Russians would help their ally Armenia in this war. Putin, 
however, has refused to provide support to Armenians, because fighting was taking 
place not on the Armenian soil but in the Karabakh region, which legally belongs to 
Azerbaijan. So, in legal terms, Russia could not get involved in this conflict because the 
war was not widespread on the Armenian territory. That explains part of the reason why 
Russia refused to help Armenia and remained neutral in this conflict. The other reason is 
that Putin detests the pro-western Armenian government and the Armenian prime 
minister Pashinyan for his anti-Russian activities. When Pashinyan came to power in 
2018 he decided to get rid of corrupt pro-Russian politicians and government officials 
and decided to replace them with pro-Western lawmakers. With these new reforms, 
Pashinyan intended to diminish Armenian‟s reliance on Russia. However, these Anti-
Russian actions have angered Putin and have raised alarm bells in the Kremlin (Oborne 
and Westad 2020). Kremlin would like to reverse the process and bring back pro-Russian 
politicians to power. 
Interestingly, the former president of Armenia, Kocharyan who is viewed as 
Pashinyan‟s rival and enjoys very good relations with the Russian political establishment, 
is back in the political scene. Russia is looking forward to changing the political 
leadership in Yerevan and therefore, does not offer any kind of help to Pashinyan. After 
the war, angry people in Yerevan stormed the parliament and demanded the resignation 
of Pashinyan for giving up the territory to Azerbaijan. Because of these large-scale 
protests, it is unlikely that Pashiniyan will remain in power. 
The final reason for Russia‟s non-involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
related to the geopolitical objectives of the Kremlin in the South Caucasus region. 
Russia‟s actions should be analyzed from the geopolitical point of view, Moscow is not 
interested in solving the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.  It is in Kremlin‟s 
interest to freeze the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to weaken both states, Azerbaijan and 
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Armenia, and bring them back to Russia‟s orbit. Moscow aims to establish firm control 
over South Caucasus because of its enormous strategic importance as a bridge between 
Europe and Asia. Moscow does not like the fact that foreign powers try to gain a 
foothold in this strategically important region, which was viewed before as a „Russian 
backyard‟. South Caucasus borders energy-rich regions such as the Middle East, the 
Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and the shortest route from Europe to Asia pass through 
this region. South Caucasus is a very important transport corridor and a vital link 
between East and West. This region can play a very important role in increasing trade, 
economic and commercial links between Asia and Europe. Over the last years, the 
development of transportation infrastructure has increased considerably the strategic 
significance of this region. Russia wants to strengthen its influence in the post- Soviet 
space and therefore, sees the West and other great powers as its geostrategic 
competitors.  
The Cold War, which ended in Europe in the 90s, is now raging in South 
Caucasus. Now, Caucasus is the region where geopolitical and geo-economics interests 
of great powers collide with each other. They all try to gain a foothold in this 
strategically important region. Russia views all other powers as its rivals and tries to 
bring back this region under its firm control (Modebadze 2018). 
The Russian government knows that frozen conflicts are a serious headache for 
Caucasian states and prevent their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Kremlin 
views the expansion of NATO as a threat and wants to prevent the integration of 
Caucasian states in this organization. Russia‟s main objective is to stop the eastward 
expansion of NATO. NATO enlargement and moving military infrastructure closer to the 
Russian borders are seen as foreign policy threats. Russia is aware that as long as the 
South Caucasian states are involved in ethnic conflicts and wars, their chances of 
integration into NATO and Euro-Atlantic structures is very low. Thus, it is in Russia‟s 
interest to maintain political, economic, and social instability in the Caucasus to prevent 
the expansion of NATO and the incorporation of Caucasian states into NATO.  
Russia is the only winner of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The deal that was signed 
on 9 November benefits Russia. It plays a vital role in strengthening Russia‟s presence in 
the South Caucasus region. This deal allows Russia to deploy „peacekeeping forces‟ to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region (Dyer 2020). By sending peacekeeping forces to 
Nagorno-Karabakh Russia establishes a permanent military presence in Azerbaijan. 
Apart from this, Russia gains the right to control the Lachin corridor, which plays a 
crucial role in connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Lachin corridor is used by 
Armenia as a logistical route to send supplies into Nagorno-Karabakh. By controlling 
this strategically important corridor Russia has a chance to gain greater leverage over 
Armenia. Isolated and impoverished Armenia will become more dependent on Russia 
and its sovereignty will be jeopardized. As Russia‟s influence grows in the region, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan may become the satellite states of Russia in the future.  
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Another corridor, that Russia is going to use as a political weapon and leverage 
for controlling conflicting parties, is the strategic corridor that will connect Azerbaijan 
with Nakhichevan and Turkey. This corridor has a great strategic significance for Baku as 
it will be the shortest route from Azerbaijan to Turkey. According to the deal, Russian 
FSB′s Border Troops have the right to control this corridor, which will play a crucial role 
in connecting Turkic speaking countries with each other. Azerbaijan and Russia may use 
this corridor for the implementation of large-scale energy projects. This deal helped 
Russia to increase its influence in the South Caucasus region (Esipov 2020). This new 
agreement is unlikely to end hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. On the 
contrary, it can provoke a war in the future, as both sides are very much dissatisfied with 




As we have seen above, it is very difficult to achieve peace in the South Caucasus 
and solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully for many reasons. First of all, we 
should take into account the fact that conflicting sides have contradictory geopolitical 
objectives and cannot reach a consensus during negotiations. Neither side is willing to 
make concessions and reach an agreement. We should take into account also Russia‟s 
geopolitical and geo-economic interests, the Kremlin would like to establish total 
control over the South Caucasus and does not want this region to become a European 
transport and energy corridor. Therefore, Russian authorities will always try to 
destabilize this region through frozen conflicts. Russia will always support separatist 
forces in this region to disrupt the realization of new and important megaprojects in the 
South Caucasus. Kremlin aims to prolong the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve 
its geopolitical objective in South Caucasus – weaken both states, Armenia and 
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